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1 Introduction.
Globalization of trade has brought quality attributes of consumption goods
under the limelight. Confronted with worldwide division of labor, individuals
and firms can no longer trace the origin nor control the composition of in-
puts or products. A permanent flow of innovations exacerbates the problem.
This is obviously true for complex commodities like pharmaceutical products,
but it is also true for more simple ones like agricultural products with, for
instance, the appearance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or cer-
tified seeds. Consumers and public authorities are giving weight to quality
attributes such as nutritional content, safety, functionality, and social and
environmental impact. They want to purchase commodities the origin and
composition of which is certified. In the process, problems arise linked to the
possibility for consumer deception and, more generally, to the efficient signal-
ing of the quality attributes of goods and services. This problem of quality
signaling is global. However, it is far worse in developing countries than in
advanced economies because of the structural weakness of their governments.
Counterfeiting of drugs illustrates the extent of the problem. These drugs
are produced in developing countries, mainly in India, and exported to other
developing countries where they represent a threat to public health.1 It is
estimated that in some parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa, 30% of the
medicines on sale are counterfeit. By contrast, advanced economies have a
low percentage of counterfeit drugs, less than 1% of market value (OECD
2008).
Although it is important to understand why this problem is so prevalent
in developing countries and what can be done about it, there are surprisingly
very few studies on this topic. In the context of developing countries, the
literature focuses on the impact of process certification of products purchased
by consumers in the North on the welfare of producers in the South. Ex-
amples of process certification include various labels for organic farming and
fair trade (e.g., Max Havelaar). The development literature has not, until
now, considered how consumers in the South might have access to the high
quality, certified products consumed in the North, such as pharmaceuticals
1It is estimated that India produces 75% of these drugs, followed by 7% from Egypt and
6% from China (Barnes 2007). In 2003, estimates of the annual earnings from substandard
and/or counterfeit drugs were over US$32 billion (WHO 2004). More generally an OECD
(2008) study concluded that international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods could
have accounted for up to USD 250 billion in 2007, representing 1.95% of world trade.
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or agricultural seeds. Yet the high prices of these products form a barrier to
access in the South. The present paper contributes to the literature by focus-
ing on the implications of certification costs on the industrial organization
of the sectors confronted with difficulties in signaling quality in developing
countries. We illustrate our theoretical analysis of the problem with agricul-
tural seed certification. The paper first studies the laissez-faire equilibrium,
notably firms’ strategies in pricing and supply of quality (sustained at best
with self-certification, at worst by nothing); and secondly, it explores the
types of economic policies that can be implemented to improve quality and
welfare.
Quality signaling can better be understood once different categories of
goods are acknowledged. Nelson (1970) and Darbi and Karni (1973) devel-
oped the triple categorization of search, experience and credence attributes of
goods. Search attributes are those for which consumers can assess the quality
of a good before purchasing it. Typical examples are external physical at-
tributes such as color, size, polish and style. Experience attributes are those
for which consumers cannot assess the qualities until they have purchased
and used or consumed them. Typical examples are taste, system function-
ality, performance, or productivity. It is only by trialing the goods, with
experience, that the quality can be assessed (e.g. software, cars). Finally,
credence attributes are those for which consumers can assess the quality at-
tributes neither before nor after purchase and use. Typical cases refer to
environmental impact at the production stage, to health and safety related
attributes such as food nutritional composition, or to the chemical formula of
a drug. Historically, as the set of products and technological processes have
broadened to encompass an increasing number of credence goods, consumers’
awareness and demand for quality have risen over time. As a result, quality
signaling to consumers has become a major challenge.
One practical solution to this problem is the process known as certifi-
cation. Certification may be defined as a process whereby an unobservable
quality level of a product is made known to the consumer through some la-
beling system, usually issued by a third independent party. There are both
product and process certification, the first linked mostly to consumption, the
second linked mostly to production. The international ISO 9000 and ISO
14000 families of norms address, respectively, these two types. Obviously, a
major concern with certification is consumer confidence which depends on the
credibility of the certification process and stamp. It must be done by an au-
thority above all suspicion. A second concern, which is directly linked to the
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first, is that to signal quality without or with little uncertainty, certification is
costly and may indeed in some cases be very costly. Typical examples relate
to health and environmental safety. In addition, such assessment procedures
take time. In developed countries, enforcement is carried out by government
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration in the United States;
or by private certification firms such as Underwriters Laboratories, who is-
sues the US Green Seal. In developing countries, the public sector is usually
unable to exercise adequate control over private supply chains because of
their limited ressources and weak governance. It leaves the market either to-
tally unregulated or open to private certification (e.g., to NGOs such as the
Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International, who issue fairtrade labels).2
The present paper focuses on how certification costs in poor countries im-
pact on market structure and performance when quality is costly to produce
and unobservable by consumers. The costlier the certification process, the
fewer will be the firms able to afford it. We study how these supply factors
intersect with the demand for certification, which is the driving force behind
the whole process, and what the characteristics of a market for certification
look like. How the certification process is made credible is left as a black box.
But we do assume that to credibly signal quality, firms rely on a certification
process that is costly.
We first show that private incentives to self-certify quality are sub-optimal.
Certification is an input in the firms production process, which for credibility
reasons is better achieved by an independent party. Third party certification
is better than self-certification because it avoids duplication of certification
costs. We next study the optimal certification policy both under private and
public funding. Poor political governance and inefficient institutions raise the
shadow cost of public funding and make credible certification much harder
for governments in developing countries to achieve. In the absence of pub-
lic funding, even when producing high quality products is relatively cheap,
poor countries are trapped with low quality products due to the high cost
of certification. This is an area where international aid agencies and NGOs
can play a significant role by bringing credibility to the certification process
as well as funds.
We illustrate the importance of certification for development using the
example of agricultural seeds. The reason for the choice of seeds is their in-
creasing importance in a world where a growing population needs ever more
2See http://www.fairtrade.net
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food and fiber. According to the FAO, 800 million people today are chroni-
cally undernourished. Many countries face food shortages and emergencies.
Since the world population is predicted to grow from 7 billion to 8.3 billion
by the year 2025, the food insecurity problem is likely to worsen. Finally,
more than 70% of the world’s poor live in rural areas and agriculture is their
main source of income and employment (The World Bank, 2013). We do
not however conduct an empirical test of the theory because the dataset is
small and of insufficient quality. Nevertheless, combined with the theoretical
analysis, it provides some insight into the problems raised by the financing
of seed certification and, beyond, by the supply of high quality products in
developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a review of
the development literature on certification issues, including the case of certi-
fication in the seed market: this is to illustrate the relevance of the problem
addressed in this paper. Section 3 presents a simple model that describes
the relationship between demand for certified goods and services, certifica-
tion costs, and market structure. Section 4 examines the relevance and role
of the external provision of certification when self-certification is inefficient,
and it compares the public and private funding of the certification process in
developing countries. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Examples and related literature
There is a substantial body of empirical and applied literature dealing with
labeling and certification. Fields of application relate to quality of the envi-
ronment and food safety.3 A major concern with the certification of credence
attributes is the extent to which the certification process is credible to con-
sumers. This issue has been investigated in a series of theoretical papers
which highlight the difficulty in achieving an efficient market for certifica-
tion.4 This suggests that public intervention might be a good thing in this
3See Gallastegui (2002) for a survey and discussion of the literature on eco-labels and
Lesourd and Schilizzi, (2001), chapter 9, for an overview of the ISO 9000 and ISO 14000
families of international norms for quality. In agricultural economics, the literature focuses
on public and private policies governing credence attributes of foods, generally from a game
theoretical approach (see Dranove and Jin 2010 and Bonroy and Constantatos 2013 for
nice surveys.
4See Biglaiser 1993, Wolinsky 1993, Emons 1997, 2001, Lizzeri 1999, Albano and Lizzeri
2001, Jahn, Schramm and Spiller 2005.
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area. However, credibility is sometimes difficult to achieve for the govern-
ment.
Certification is a form of information provision, and the quality of that
information cannot be disconnected from the quality of the social bodies that
produce it. This raises the question of who, government, NGOs or private
firms, should be in charge of providing certification. To answer this question
it is useful to look at the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR).
Besley and Ghatak (2007) define CSR as the corporate provision of public
goods, or the curtailment of public bads, independent of legal benchmarks.
According to Besley and Ghatak (2007) CSR is a reaction to distortions in
government preferences or poor monitoring by government.5 This is espe-
cially relevant in the case of developing countries, where governments can be
opportunistic, corrupt, or have (re)distributional preferences, thereby creat-
ing inefficiencies.
If CSR is not profitable, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play
an important role in conveying reliable information to consumers. Since in
matter of public good provision, ownership should be in the hand of the party
who values the project most (see Besley and Ghatak 2001 and Ghatak 2005),
NGOs might be the most able to carry out credible certification in develop-
ing countries.6 Most social and environmental standards have hence been
developed by NGOs, such as the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations Interna-
tional (FLO), International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
(IFOAM), Social Accountability International (SA-8000 standard) and the
Sustainable Agriculture Network/Rainforest Alliance (see FAO 2004). These
international NGOs aim at influencing policy by informing consumers on so-
cial and/or environmental issues, through awareness campaigns, boycotts,
certification schemes and product labeling.
Even if the signaling of quality through certification is not perfect, it
is sufficiently trustworthy to exist and convey useful information. Labeling
5Besley and Ghatak (2007) outline conditions under which CSR produces higher welfare
(i.e., a second-best level) than public or other private provision channels. They illuminate
the direct parallel with traditional models of private provision of public goods and show
that CSR will exactly reproduce the second best equilibrium levels of public good provision
envisioned by the standard literature. Only if governments fail to deliver optimal levels
of public good will CSR be potentially efficient. For more on the CSR literature see the
survey by Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012).
6For an interesting discussion of the role of NGOs in public good provision in developing
countries see Besley and Ghatak (2006).
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of credence attributes is widely used and trusted by consumers who pur-
chase everyday pharmaceutical, organic, fairtrade or eco-friendly products.
Similarly, firms continuously buy certified inputs, such as certified seeds for
farmers or chemicals for manufacturers. The present paper abstracts from
the problem of achieving a credible certification. The certification process is
left as a black box: in exchange for a (possibly very high) fixed cost, certifi-
cation can be achieved.7 This approach is consistent with the development
literature on the topic, which also assumes perfect certification.
The development literature on certification has, until now, focused on
how the fair trade and social labeling of products consumed in the North
has affected the welfare of poor workers or farmers in the South (i.e., certi-
fication of a production process). Examples of process certification include
various labels for organic farming, Protected Designation of Origin (PDO),
and fair trade. In the wealthier and more industrialized countries, many
people are hence prepared to pay a premium to consume goods that are
certified to preserve the environment, or to be produced in an ethical way.
For instance, 2008 world sales of ”fair trade” and other ethical products ex-
ceeded $2.8 billion (see the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International
at http://www.fairtrade.net). Similarly, total U.S. organic sales, including
food and nonfood products, were $17.7 billion in 2006 (see the Organic Trade
Association 2007 Manufacturer Survey at http://www.ota.com).
The insights from the development literature are mixed. Theoretically,
it is not clear that the introduction of social labeling improves the welfare
of poor workers in the South. In the context of exports from the South,
Baland and Duprez (2009) study, using a general equilibrium framework, the
impact of a label certifying the absence of child labour. They show that
when obtaining a label is easy, its impact is considerably reduced by a dis-
placement effect: adult workers replace children in the export sector while
children replace adults in the domestic sector. When obtaining a label is
hard, so that in equilibrium rationing occurs, and when the South exports
both labelled and unlabelled products to the North, producers using a label
generally gain from the introduction of the label, while those not using a
label generally lose. Ex ante welfare may thus fall in the South if the prob-
ability of getting a label when one qualifies is small. Finally, the impact
7For instance McCluskey (2000) demonstrates that credence good markets with prob-
abilistically accurate certification are transformed into experience good markets when
consumers engage in repeated purchases.
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on child labour is in general ambiguous, as the reaction of child labour to
higher or lower adult and children wages depends on the strength of income
and substitution effects. Similarly Basu, Chau, and Grote (2006) show that
”Child-Labor Free” social labeling benefits consumers and Southern produc-
ers, whereas children and Northern producers are worse off. Trade sanctions
on unlabeled products deteriorates Southern terms of trade, but leaves the in-
cidence of child labor strictly unaffected; and a threat to sanction imports of
unlabeled Southern products discourages the South from maintaining a cred-
ible social labeling program. Kotchen (2006) shows that the introduction of
green products, which are based on technologies with joint production of a
private good and an environmental public good, can have detrimental effects
on environmental quality and social welfare. His analysis applies equally
to non-environmental choice settings, with examples ranging from socially
responsible investments to commercial activities associated with charitable
fund-raising. Focusing on the Fair Trade initiative, De Janvry, McIntosh and
Sadoulet (2012) argue that attempts to create rents for poor producers via
increased prices in an otherwise competitive market is unlikely to succeed. In
a partial equilibrium framework they show how the benefits of Fair Trade are
diluted due to over-certification and quality-invariant pricing. They support
their theoretical results with the help of data from an association of coffee
cooperatives in Central America: the lack of quality differentiation and over-
certification cause almost complete dissipation of producer rents. Auriol and
Miquel-Florensa (2014), also focusing on coffee, show that cream-skimming
of the best quality by private buyers, as well as free-riding problems, lead
to a degradation of quality in Fair Trade products and to an erosion of the
cooperatives’ profits.
Empirically, results on the impact of fair trade and social labeling are
also ambiguous. Chakrabarty and Grote (2009) and Chakrabarty, Grote,
and Luechters (2011) analyze which factors determine the probability that a
child will work in the carpet industry, and examine the influence of NGOs
that are engaged in the social labeling process. From interviews, they find
a positive link between social labeling and the removal of child laborers for
households above the subsistence level. However, for households below the
subsistence level, no significant influence has been found. Furthermore, social
labeling is more likely to reduce child labor if the labeling NGOs engage in
more monitoring - though this too is not without cost.
In the case of fair trade, the evaluation of the socio-economic impact
of certification has been the focus of an extensive debate but has failed to
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provide conclusive answers. Philpott, Bichier, Rice and Greenberg (2007),
Becchetti and Constantino (2008) and Arnould, Plastina and Ball (2009),
find a positive effect of certification on prices, but not necessarily on farmers’
net income. Ruben and Fort (2012) show that the benefit is particularly
small when one takes into account the selection bias inherent to participation
in Fair Trade markets. Balineau (2013) provides an interesting discussion of
this debate. Jena, Stellmacher and Grote (2012) study the impact of product
certification on the livelihoods of Ethiopian small-scale coffee farmers. They
find that certification of coffee cooperatives has a small impact on members’
livelihoods, mainly due to low productivity, an insignificant impact on price
premium, and does not allow members much access to credit and information
from the cooperative. Blackman and Rivera (2010) survey the literature on
environmental and socioeconomic impacts of ”sustainable” certification and
conclude that the empirical evidence of any significant benefits gained from
sustainable certification is limited. Finally, a discussion has started on the
external effects of certification rules on the sustainability of cooperatives, as
discussed in Haight (2011).
The development literature has not considered how consumers in develop-
ing countries might have access to the high quality, certified products usually
produced and consumed in the North. The present paper studies how the
signaling of product quality, and the increasing need for certification, distorts
market equilibrium of the final product in the South, and how this depends
on the cost of the certification process and on how tight are the government’s
budget constraints. It is worth pointing out that the analysis in this paper
does not need to appeal to general equilibrium conditions: a partial equilib-
rium analysis at industry level is sufficient. This is because the purpose is not
to examine the impact of international trade (Fair or not) on producers in the
South, but to shed light on how local certification costs prevent consumers in
the South from accessing high quality goods. In what follows, we illustrate,
using the example of agricultural seeds, the problem of access by the poor
to certified products, as well as how organizing the market for certification
can impact on consumption. The reason why we do not illustrate it with
pharmaceuticals is the lack of reliable data on the production and consump-
tion of uncertified medicines. Counterfeit medicines are by definition illegal.
The information available on the uncertified segment of the pharmaceutical
industry is patchy and anecdotal. By contrast, uncertified seeds are legal to
produce, consume and sell. Data is available on the level of consumption
both of certified and uncertified seeds.
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2.1 Agricultural seed certification
Farmers around the world have access to several sorts of seeds. They can use
home-grown seeds, saved from last year’s harvest, or they can purchase them
on the market. If purchased on the market, they can choose, at some extra
cost, certified seeds, or be content with uncertified seeds. This is important
for illustrating the theory we propose below. In our model, purchasing certi-
fied products is a consumer choice based on price and quality. We need data
on both variables to understand the impact of certification costs on consump-
tion. The fact that seed is a production input, rather than a consumer good,
is not important: in both cases, we are interested in the demand for the cer-
tified good as a function of buyer’s wealth, market size and cost. The cost of
certified seeds depends on the way the certification market is organized. We
want to understand how the industrial organization of this sector influences
the demand for certified products.
Data was found and compiled from an FAO publication, ”FAO Seed Re-
view 1989-90”. Useful information came in the form of tables giving, for
each major crop grown in the country, the quantities of certified seed used.
Because different countries grow different crops, we focused on two staple
crops: wheat, presented in the appendix, and rice, in the main text. Indeed
rice is the most important grain with regards to human nutrition and caloric
intake, providing more than one fifth of the calories consumed worldwide
by humanity. It is especially important in developing countries. The FAO
seed review also contains information on public intervention in seed markets
(i.e., on pricing policies and on whether a country has a formal procedure to
perform seed certification or not). Based on this information, we construct
three dummy variables that represent whether a country has (i) no seed pol-
icy at all (Laissezfaire), (ii) a private sector providing seeds controlled by
a legal framework and procedure (Private), or (iii) public control of seed
prices and/or (para)public seed provision (Public). These seed policies are
mutually exclusive (i.e. if one of the dummies is equal to 1 then necessarily
the other two are 0). Since these variables are binary, we run probit regres-
sions. Appendix 6.1 provides a description of the dependant variables as well
as of the auxiliary data.
The first column of table 1 shows that laissez-faire is more likely to occur
when GDP per capita is low (the coefficient is negative and almost significant
at the 10% level) and when the agricultural value-added in percentage of
GDP, denoted AGRIAV , is low. That is, it is more likely to occur in poor
10
Table 1: Certified Seed Policy
Laissezfaire Private Public
Constant 1.3 0.66 -1.81
(1.31) (0.83) (-1.96)**
GDP per capita -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002
(-1.59) (3.14)*** (-2.33)**
AREARICE -0.005 -0.004 0.005
(-1.21) (-1.28) (1.46)
AREAWHEAT -0.018 0.003 -0.002
(-1.39) (1.72)* (-1.39)
AGRIAV -0.07 -0.02 0.039
(-2.59)*** (-1.28) (1.91)*
GOVCONSUMP -0.056 -0.07 0.09
(-1.34) (-1.88)* (2.35)**
No. Obs. 67 67 67
Obs with Dep=1 5 34 28
McFadden R2 0.27 0.4 0.45
Sum squared Resid 4.03 9.43 8.06
Columns (1) to (3) were estimated by probit. White heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are used to calculate z-statistics reported in
parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** (1%); ** (5%); * (10%).
countries with a small agricultural sector. The second column shows that a
Private sector supplying certified seeds is more likely to occur when the GDP
per capita is large, when the areas dedicated to wheat are large, and when
government consumption in percentage of GDP, GOV CONSUMP , is low.
In other words, it is more likely if countries are rich wheat growers with tight
public budget constraints.8 The third column shows that a policy of Public
subsidies is more likely to occur in poor countries (i.e., when the GDP per
capita is low), when agriculture represents a big percentage of national GDP
(i.e., when AGRIAV is large), and when public spending is unconstrained
(i.e., GOV CONSUMP is large).
We are interested in the impact of the certification policy on the demand
of certified products. We present in table 2 the results for rice. Appendix
6.1 shows that the results for wheat are very similar to those obtained for
8It is worth noting that the AGRIAV coefficient is negative and not significantly
different from 0. This is not surprising as richer economies have a smaller agricultural
sector than poorer ones in terms of percentage of GDP .
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Table 2: Demand of Certified Seed of Rice
Dependent Variable: log(CERTIFRICE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -7.52 -4.5 -6.99 -6.34 -6.32
(-3.51)*** (-1.43) (-3.12)*** (-2.86)*** (-2.53)**
log(GDP) 0.88 0.6 0.87 0.64 0.73
(4.41)*** (2.08)** (4.35)*** (2.41)** (2.89)***
log(AREARICE) 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.74
(6.28)*** (5.27)*** (6.03)*** (6.62)*** (6.64)***
log(TRACTOR) 0.23
(0.88)
log(FERTI) 0.01
(0.03)
log(IRRIG) -0.03
(-0.16)
log(RURALPOP) -0.3
(-1.63)
LAISSEZFAIRE -1.28
(-2.08)**
PRIVATE 1.26
(1.98)*
PUBLIC -0.79
(-1.26)
No. Obs. 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.6 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.61
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.59
Sum squared Resid 110.42 101.65 104.7 96.72 105.4
Columns (1) to (5) were estimated by ordinary least squares. White heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are used to calculate t-statistics, which are reported in paren-
theses. Significance is denoted by *** (1%); ** (5%); * (10%).
12
rice. In column 1, we regress the total quantity of certified seeds of rice,
CERTIFRICE (expressed in metric tons) on the GDP per capita, GDP ,
and on the area grown with rice, AREARICE (expressed in hectares). Logs
are taken of all values. The estimated coefficients are positive and significant
at the 1 % level. This is consistent with poor consumers being stuck with
uncertified commodities because they are unable to purchase the high quality,
expensive certified ones. We next check how the use of certified seeds is
influenced by the availability of other agricultural inputs. When we run
the basic model of column 1 with inputs as auxiliary variables, GDP and
AREARICE are the only variables which are significantly different from 0
and are positive (see appendix 6.1 for details and other robustness checks).
Finally, we add the policy dummies to assess their impact on the adoption
of certified rice seeds. Farmers who operate under a laissez-faire regime
use significantly less certified seeds, while farmers operating under a private
regime use significantly more certified seeds than other economic variables
would suggest. By contrast, the coefficient of Public is negative, which is
the wrong sign, and it is not significant, suggesting that a public policy
of subsidies and price controls has a rather poor impact on the adoption
of certified seeds. This result might reflect an endogeneity problem. Indeed,
governments that choose to implement a policy of price controls do so to fight
low productivity in agriculture, and this is linked to the use of traditional
inputs, such as uncertified seeds and natural fertilizers. If public policy takes
time to become effective, for instance because of learning effects, we might
observe a negative sign of the Public dummy. The small sample size and the
lack of proper instruments prevent us from addressing this problem in any
depth.
In the theoretical analysis presented below, we explore different ways
to organize the market for certification, namely laissez-faire, private and
public certification, and we check their impact on the consumption of certified
products. We also derive optimal certification policies to confront them with
the results in table 1.
3 The model
We consider a commodity which can be supplied with various levels of quality.
Consumers are assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function. The utility
of a consumer with characteristics (a, β) ∈ R2+ consuming q ≥ 0 units of
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a good of quality v > 0 is U(w, v, q) = w + u(q, v) = w + aq − q2
2βv
, where
w = M − pq ≥ 0 is the consumer’s net income. Substituting w in the utility
function and optimizing U(M − pq, v, q) with respect to q yields a quality
augmented linear demand:9
d(p, v) = βv(a− p) (1)
Substituting (1) in the utility function, we deduce that the indirect utility,
or equivalently the net surplus, of a consumer with characteristics (a, β) when
he purchases a quantity q = d(p, v) of the commodity with quality v and unit
price p is:10
S(p, v) = M + β
v(a− p)2
2
. (2)
Consumers maximize their net surplus when choosing which quality specifi-
cation of the commodity to purchase. Quality is a vertically differentiated
variable. The consumers have unanimous preference over the quality set.
They all prefer high quality to low quality at a given price. Equation (2)
implies that, confronted with the quality/price bundles (vj, pj) and (vj′ , pj′),
any consumer with characteristic a chooses to purchase specification j if and
only if vj(a − pj)2 ≥ vj′(a − pj′)2. The consumer chooses j′ otherwise. In
other words, the choice of the commodity is not dependent on M , nor on β,
whereas the quantity purchased by each individual increases with β.
Lemma 1 The consumers in group a have unanimous preferences, repre-
sented by the function v(a− p)2, over the quality/price set (v, p).
This result will prove to be useful. In particular it implies that all con-
sumers with characteristic a purchase the same specification of the commod-
ity. One could think that Lemma 1, and the other results of the paper,
depend on the specific way v enters the linear demand function. However
our results are robust to any other quality augmented linear model where
quantity and quality are complements. There are basically two types of
quality augmented linear models such that ∂
2P (q,v)
∂q∂v
≥ 0. The first one is as
in our base model (1). The second is of the type d(p, v) = β(av − p) so that
9Our demand is a quality augmented version of the standard linear demand model for
differentiated goods by Singh and Vives (1984). For a discussion of quality augmented
models, see Sutton (1991,1997).
10That is S(p, v) = U(M − pd(p, v), v, d(p, v)) = M − pd(p, v) + ad(p, v)− d(p,v)22βv .
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the indirect utility function is S(p, v) = M + β (va−p)
2
2
. The consumers in
group a have unanimous preferences over (v, p), represented by the function
(va − p)2. Lemma 1 is robust, and we will see later on that all our other
results are robust as well.11
We assume that there is a continuum of B consumers with characteristic
a in the population. Let b = BEβ where Eβ is the mean value of β in group
a. The total demand in group a is
Da,b(p, v) = bv(a− p). (3)
The demand price elasticity is p,D = − pa−p . Since it depends only on a,
we deduce that all consumers with characteristic a have the same sensitivity
to price. The larger a is, the less consumer behavior is affected by a price
rise. As it is standard with linear demand, a can thus be interpreted as a
wealth index (e.g., propensity to pay), while b is a scale factor reflecting het-
erogeneous need and size in the consumer population (a larger β corresponds
to a larger individual demand and a larger b to a larger aggregated demand).
For instance, with consumption goods, β is typically the size of the house-
hold and b the size of the population, while in the agricultural seeds example
presented above, β is the size of the plots cultivated with rice or wheat at
the farm level and b the area cultivated with the relevant crop at the country
level.
On the supply side, we assume that production of the commodity in-
volves a constant returns to scale technology. That is, the market is a priori
competitive. If a distortion appears, it can be ascribed to the unobservable
aspect of quality (i.e. to the fact that it is a credence attribute). We can
hence isolate the impact of quality signaling on market structure and on in-
dustry performance. The minimal quality level that can be provided by the
firm is v (v ≥ 0). The cost function of producer j (j ∈ N+) is linear:
C(qj, vj) = c(vj)qj (4)
where qj ≥ 0 is the quantity produced by firm j at quality vj ≥ v, and c(v)
is strictly increasing and convex.
In what follows, we study the benchmark case where quality is observable
either prior to purchasing -search attribute- or equivalently verifiable through
use -experience attribute-.
11In both cases the term v could be replaced by g(v) with the function g being strictly
increasing and concave in v. It would not change our results. The formula of the optimal
quality level would simply be change as explained in footnote 12.
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3.1 Quality is observable
Consider first the case of a search attribute. Under the constant returns to
scale assumption, when quality is observable prior to purchase, there is no
quality signaling problem: the market is perfectly competitive. At equilib-
rium, prices are equal to marginal cost p = c(v). At this price firms are
free to produce any quantity. However with respect to a standard Walrasian
production unit, firms still have a strategic variable to set: the quality level.
As quality is observable prior to purchase, it is a strategic variable in the
same way as price is. If a firm fails to choose the right level of quality for
the product, it will go bankrupt (exactly as if it fails to price the commodity
at marginal cost). Indeed, by virtue of lemma 1, consumers in group a have
unanimous preferences over the quality/price set, embodied in the v(a− p)2
function. When price is set at marginal cost, consumers in group a choose
the specification of the commodity that maximizes v
(
a−c(v))2. The optimal
quality level from consumer’s a point of view, denoted va, is solution to the
following equation:12
c(v) + 2vc′(v) = a (5)
The optimal quality level increases with a (i.e., dva
da
= 1
3c′(v)+2vc′′(v) ≥ 0). The
wealthier the population is, the larger the level of quality it seeks, a rather
intuitive point. Then, on segment a of the market either a firm sells quality
va defined in equation (5) at marginal cost pa = c(va), or else it disappears.
At equilibrium the quantity is qa,b = Da,b(va, c(va)) = bv
(
a− c(va)
)
and the
firm’s profit is 0 no matter the group (a, b) it serves. To rule out corner
solution in the following we focus on cases where a is not too small.13
Assumption 1 a > c(va)
Finally, optimizing with respect to v and q, the net surplus of trade
associated with group a of consumers, S = aq − q2
2vb
− c(v)q, yields va and
qa,b. The market allocation is Pareto efficient. We denote by S
∗ the associated
12If v was replaced by g(v) equation (5) would be c(v) + 2 g(v)g′(v)c
′(v) = a.
13Since the price varies between marginal cost c(va) and monopoly price
c(va)+a
2 , as-
sumption 1 is a sufficient condition to ensure that the quantities purchased by all con-
sumers (a, β) are positive in all possible equilibria. Moreover if M is not too small (i.e.,
if M > βvp(a− p)) we have interior solutions. Since βvp(a− p) is maximum for p = a2 a
sufficient condition is that 4M ≥ βvaa2.
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surplus from trade.14
S∗ =
bva
(
a− c(va)
)2
2
(6)
Now if quality is an experience attribute (i.e. if it is observable only
after purchasing the good), there is a potential quality signaling problem.
Since the firms can pretend to sell high quality and shirk, consumers are not
ready to pay a high price for quality. However, when consumers are able
to detect ex-post fraudulent claims, there are several ways to successfully
signal quality to them. The most common, and cheapest one, consists in
offering a warranty contract along with the commodity. The product is sold
with a guarantee specifying the quality level va and a penalty rule in case
of consumer deception. Provided the penalty is high enough, firms have
no incentive to deviate: In equilibrium the quality is as specified, and the
guarantee contract is never used. In the case of repeated purchases and
associated reputation building, sunk investments such as advertising, quality
grading or prices are other ways, though distortive, to signal quality.15 When
quality is observable by consumers after purchasing (e.g. through use), the
under-provision problem can be solved at virtually zero cost.
We conclude that when quality is verifiable, either before or after the
purchase (i.e., search or experience attribute), quality va, solution of equation
(5), is sold at marginal cost pa = c(va) to the group with characteristics (a, b).
The equilibrium quantity is qa,b = bva
(
a − c(va)
)
leading to the net surplus
S∗ defined by equation (6). The outcome (va, qa,b) is Pareto efficient.16
14With S(p, v) = b2 (va− p)2, the optimal quality for group a is so that c′(v) = a which
implies that S∗ = b2
(
ava − c(va)
)2. Assumption 1 is equivalent to a > c(va)/va.
15Grossman (1981) has studied the role of warranty. The role of price signals for ex-
perience goods was studied by Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Staiger (1989),
Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Daughety and Reinganum (1995), and that of adver-
tising by Schmalensee (1979). The role of reputation building was studied by Shapiro
(1982,1983), Grossman and Shapiro (1988) and Falvey (1989), while Jovanovic (1982) and
Matthews and Postlethwaite (1985), Hollander et al. (1999) investigate the role of grading
in signaling experience attributes.
16With S(p, v) = b2 (va− p)2, the quality is so that c′(v) = a and the quantity is qa,b =
b
(
ava − c(va)
)
for group a which yields S∗ = b2
(
ava − c(va)
)2.
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3.2 Quality is a credence attribute
We now study what happens to the efficient outcome of section 3.1 when
quality is a credence attribute. Quality is said to be a credence attribute
when it cannot be evaluated by a consumer, even after ’consumption’, but
has perceived value. There are many attributes of goods that are of this
type. Examples include nutritional contents of food, aircraft safety, chemical
composition of a drug, impact of a production process on the environment,
age and working conditions of the workforce, and genetic material contained
in seeds. When consumers never observe (neither prior nor after the pur-
chase) the quality level of the products they buy, producers of poor quality
can pretend to offer high quality products. From the consumers’ perspective,
they are not discernable. For instance, whether a shirt was manufactured by
a child or by an adult, it is the same shirt in the end. Yet many people
disapprove of children being put to work and are willing to pay a premium
to avoid that happening. It is the same problem with an environmentally
friendly versus a polluting technology. They cannot be told apart based on
the final product. In this context, a firm that would think of producing high
quality anticipates that it will not be able to recover its cost, since consumers
cannot discriminate between low and high quality products (whether before
or after purchasing). It then supplies the minimal level. Symmetrically,
consumers anticipate that, since their profits decrease with higher quality,
firms are going to supply minimal quality, no matter what they claim. They
therefore purchase from the cheapest producers. At equilibrium, there is a
unique quality level offered, which is the minimum one, v. It is competitively
supplied at price p = c(v). A firm that would deviate from this low qual-
ity/marginal cost pricing strategy would go bankrupt. The net surplus falls
to the level S.
S =
bv
(
a− c(v)
)2
2
. (7)
In the context of credence attributes, there is an incentive for the producer
to cut quality, since cutting quality reduces cost but not demand. Moreover,
by virtue of equation (5), if there are different groups of wealth a in the
population, in the absence of signaling problems, there would be as many
quality levels offered as groups of wealth a. Here not only the level of quality
falls, but also the variety of qualities offered is reduced. As an extreme case
the market simply collapses. That is, whenever the minimum quality that
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can be supplied is very low, so that v = 0, then Da,b(v, c(v)) = 0 for any a.
We conclude that with a credence attribute, the quality supplied falls to the
minimum level v which is competitively supplied at price p = c(v). Consumers
with characteristics (a, b) purchase the quantity q
a,b
= v
(
a− c(v))b.17
4 Certification
When the quality is a credence attribute the market for quality collapses,
no matter what price consumers are willing to pay, and no matter what
quality producers are willing to provide. We may wonder whether traditional
ways of solving this quality problem can be helpful here. Unfortunately,
with credence attributes, guarantee contracts, signaling through prices or
reputation-building are inefficient. Consumers cannot send back the product
or boycott it based on poor quality, since they do not experience it. With
credence attributes, the solution is certification. Certification may be defined
as a process whereby an unobservable quality level of some product is made
known to the consumer through some labeling or stamping system, usually
issued by a third independent party. In other words, certification is a process
for transforming a credence attribute into a search attribute.
The cost of quality signaling is the cost of creating and maintaining a
credible authority to enforce the denominations, labels and brands. Whether
the firm is small or large, the cost of setting up such an organization is the
same. It is independent of the production cost of the commodity to be cer-
tified. It is basically a fixed cost, potentially a very high one. For instance,
to provide reliable and credible information to consumers on the biophysical,
biochemical, and microbiological attributes of seed, food and drugs, requires
costly equipment and highly trained plant scientists in dedicated private or
public laboratories. To achieve credibility firms have to create an indepen-
dent organisation which has to survive on the proceeds of its certification
work. It is to reinforce credibility that the Fairtrade Labelling Organiza-
tions International was split in two independent organizations in January
2004: Fairtrade International, the standards-setting and producer support
unit, and FLO-CERT, which inspects and certifies producer organizations
and audits traders.
In what follows the certification cost is modeled as a fixed cost (i.e., the
17With S(p, v) = b2 (va− p)2, qa,b =
(
av − c(v))b so that S = b2(av − c(v))2.
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cost to set up an independent certification agency).18 We assume that the
quality level can be publicly disclosed at cost K > 0. It is important to
distinguish this cost of creating a credible certification agency/organization
from the way the certification services are financed and priced to firms. The
cost of the certification service can be a fixed fee or it can be variable (i.e.,
per unit fee). For instance, the certification of production processes, such
as Fair Trade, social labeling or organic production, verifies compliance with
the desired standard by means of an audit. Whether the firm, cooperative or
farm is small or large the auditor has to come and review processes on-site.19
The price attached to process certification is generally a fixed fee (see Lesourd
and Schilizzi, 2001). In the case of agricultural seeds, the certification process
requires that the crop pass both field inspection and laboratory analysis, on
the basis of a sample necessary for determining germination and purity. The
price attached to such product certification is a per unit fee.20 In what
follows, we consider different ways to finance certification services: with a
fixed fee, with a per unit fee, or with taxes or foreign aid.
We first study the incentives for an individual firm to set up its own certi-
fication process. We next turn to the study of certification as an independent
activity, whether under public or under private (e.g., NGO) supply.
4.1 Private self-certification
A firm can decide to invest K > 0 in order to make its quality credible
to consumers. The important point here is that, no matter in what way
certification is achieved, and contrary to a guarantee contract which is never
used at equilibrium, the certification cost has to be paid before the purchase
can take place. For quality to be a credible signal, the certification cost
has to be sunk. This implies that even if the market is a priori competitive,
18We could also add a variable cost but it would not change our results.
19For instance, farmers who have adopted organic practices and want to ob-
tain an organic certificate for the US market need to prepare a written applica-
tion. Accredited certifying agents (i.e., by the USDA) review the written applica-
tion to verify that the practices comply with the official regulations. An inspec-
tor then conducts an on site inspection. The certifying agent reviews the report
by the inspector and the written application by the farmer. If both show that
the farmer complies with the organic regulations, an organic certificate is issued (see
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5100064).
20This is generally the same for other products certification as for instance in the case
of meat and poultry (see MacDonald et al. 1999).
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because of the certification cost which adds to the production cost, it becomes
oligopolistic with N producers. That is, competition is impossible if K > 0.
Indeed, for certification to be worthwhile, the profit of the firm that chooses
to certify its quality needs to be greater than K. Depending on K (and
on consumers’ characteristics a and b) the market structure that is going
to emerge varies widely. We model competition among firms as a Cournot
oligopoly. Since in general it is easier for a firm to change the quantity it
produces than the production process itself, we consider that quality choice is
irreversible with respect to the quantity decision which is more flexible. This
implies that in the strategic game they play the firms choose first quality and
then quantity. We may establish the following preliminary result.
Lemma 2 The firm that decides to certify its production chooses to supply
to group a of consumers the quality level va defined by equation (5).
Proof: Appendix 6.2, which shows that Lemma 2 holds for any quality
augmented linear demand so that quality and quantity are complements.
By virtue of lemma 2, at any certification equilibrium, the quality equi-
librium is va. Then on the market segment (a, b) the firms’ production are
perfect substitutes. There remains to consider the firm’s choice in quan-
tity. The relevant equilibrium concept is Nash. The equilibrium quan-
tity, depending on N ≥ 1, the total number of firms in the industry, is
Q(N) = N
N+1
va
(
a − c(va)
)
b.21 That is, Q(N) = N
N+1
qa,b, with qa,b be-
ing the first best outcome. Accordingly the total quantity supplied in-
creases with the intensity of the competition. For N = 1 we get the tra-
ditional monopoly solution, for N = 2 the Cournot duopoly solution, and
for N → ∞ the competitive outcome as described in section 3.1. The con-
sumers’ surplus, denoted SN , when they purchase the certified commodity, is
SN = bva
2
(
a− P (Q(N), va)
)2
. Substituting Q(N) by its value, and recalling
that S∗ defined by (6) is the first best surplus, it is straightforward to check
21Let Q−j =
∑
h 6=j qh denote total production excluding that of firm j and Q =
∑N
j=1 qj
the total quantity. The firm j = 1, .., N chooses its quantity qj such as to maximize:
Maxqj Πj(qj , Q−j) = P (qj +Q−j , va)qj − c(va)qj . Since P (q, v) = a− qbv , this yields qj =
va
(
a− c(va)
)
b−Q. Firms are symmetric, and the equilibrium is symmetric: qj = Q/N .
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that22
SN =
(
N
N + 1
)2
S∗. (8)
We deduce that if N ≥ 1 the consumers in group a have the choice
between purchasing a relatively expensive, high quality certified commodity
which yields net surplus SN , or a cheap, low quality uncertified version which
yields S defined by (7). They will purchase the certified commodity if and
only if SN ≥ S. This condition is equivalent to N
N+1
≥ ( S
s∗
)0.5
= (v)
0.5
(va)0.5
a−c(v)
a−c(va) .
By definition of va, we have va
(
a − c(va)
)2 ≥ v(a − c(v))2 which implies
that (v)
0.5
(va)0.5
a−c(v)
a−c(va) ≤ 1. Then if v is very low (i.e., close to zero), from the
consumers’ point of view, certification, even with a monopoly, is always better
than perfect competition without certification, which yields no surplus at
all. More importantly, for a given number of firms, N , in the industry,
certification will be preferred more often by a population with a large a than
by a population with a low one. That is, from va defined in equation (5), the
difference va
(
a − c(va)
)2 − v(a − c(v))2 increases with a. Then everything
else being equal, a population with a lower sensitivity to prices (i.e., a rich
population) prefers more often a certified commodity than a poor one, an
intuitive result.
We next compute the per capita profit assuming that consumers decide
to purchase the certified commodity. The profit of a firm, which depends on
N , the total number of firms in competition, is Π(N) = vab
(a−c(va)
N+1
)2
. That
is: Π(N) = 2
(N+1)2
S∗. Accordingly, the individual profit decreases in N and
converges to zero as competition intensifies (i.e., when N goes to infinity).
At the certification equilibrium the number of firms, denoted N(K), is the
maximal integer such that Π(N)−K ≥ 0. That is,
N(K) = INT
{(
2S∗
K
)0.5
− 1
}
. (9)
The next proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
certification equilibrium to hold. The proof of Proposition 1 is the same for
our base case and for S(p, v) = b
2
(va− p)2.
22The result is robust when P (q, v) = a(v − qb ). The firms solve Maxqj Πj(qj , Q−j) =
a(va − qj+Q−jb )qj − c(va)qj so that the equilibrium is symmetric: Q(N) = NN+1qa,b, with
qa,b = b(va − c(va)a ) being the first best outcome, which implies that SN = ( NN+1 )2S∗.
22
Proposition 1 When quality is a credence attribute, the self-certification
equilibrium prevails if and only if
S∗ ≥
[
S0.5 + (2K)0.5 + (S + 2K)0.5
2
]2
(10)
Then the market structure is oligopolistic with N(K) producers defined by
equation (9). Otherwise, the low quality/low price equilibrium prevails.
Proof: Appendix 6.3.
The larger a or b is, the easier it is for condition (10) in proposition 1
to hold. Figure 1 illustrates this result. It represents the N(K) function
for two different levels of sensitivity to price ar > ap. We deduce that the
certification equilibrium appears less often for poorer populations. It ap-
pears also less often for smaller demands. That is, the critical level of the
fixed cost K, such that the certification equilibrium is no longer sustainable,
increases with a and b. This implies that if the fixed certification cost, K,
is such that Kp < K < Kr, a rich (and/or large) population purchases
high quality/certified commodities and a poor (and/or small) one low qual-
ity/uncertified commodities.
Proposition 1 helps us to understand that in a given population there can
be market segmentation. The rich choose to purchase certified commodities
while the poor buy low quality, uncertified commodities. Proposition 1 also
helps us to understand the difference in certification levels across countries.
Indeed, developed countries consume more certified commodities than devel-
oping ones, simply because the latter have more poor than the former. The
example of agricultural seed certification, presented in section 2.1, provides
an illustration of this segmentation phenomenon: Tables 2 and 4 show a
strong positive correlation between the total quantity of certified seeds used
in agriculture and the GDP per capita. The problems surrounding pharma-
ceutical practice in developing countries is another illustration. The people
who are too poor to buy official medicines in drugstores have to rely on those
available on the street, which are uncertified. Unchecked drugs can be very
dangerous and can lead to human injury and in some cases even to death.23
23In 1995, 2500 Nigerians died from receiving a counterfeit meningitis vaccine. Cam-
bodians have also been dying because the anti-malarial drug they were taking was fake
(see Forzley 2003). In 2006, more than 100 people were killed in Panama by counterfeit
glycerin, and in 2004 more died because of fake medicines in Argentina (WHO 2008).
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Figure 1: Self-Certification Equilibrium (ar > ap)
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In many cases it is simply safer not to consume them. This leaves the popu-
lation with traditional remedies. In some Asian and African countries, 80%
of the population depend on traditional medicine for primary health care
(WHO 2008).24 The social cost of this equilibrium is very high as traditional
medicines tend to be less efficient than modern ones.
We next aim to compare the self-certification equilibrium with the op-
timal level. On the one hand, the self-certification equilibrium prevails if
and only if condition (10) holds. On the other hand, certification is efficient
if and only if S∗ ≥ K + S. Self-certification is hence inefficiently low if
K + S <
[
S0.5+(2K)0.5+(S+2K)0.5
2
]2
, which is equivalent to
(
2(S +K)0.5 − (S +
2K)0.5
)2
<
(
S0.5 +(2K)0.5
)2
. Developing the squared parenthesis yields after
some simplification 2(S +K)− 2(S + 2K)0.5(S +K)0.5 < (2KS)0.5, which is
always true as the left hand side is strictly negative for all positive K and S.
This inequality is robust to the specification S(p, v) = b
2
(va− p)2 (i.e., the
proof hinges on comparing the condition for efficient certification with (10),
not on the specific values of S∗ and S). We establish the following result.
Corollary 1 The level of self-certification is sub-optimal.
The intuition behind corollary 1 is as follows. First, the incentive of a
private firm to self-certify is related to the rents it will be able to extract
from consumers for selling its certified products. But the firm does not
internalize the whole surplus of trade: it only internalizes sales, and hence it
under-certifies. To see this point, let us consider the case where S = 0. It
is optimal to certify production as soon as S∗ ≥ K. Yet the condition for
voluntary self-certification to hold, obtained by setting S = 0 in (10), is:
S∗ ≥ 2K. (11)
Unless the surplus S∗ is twice as large as K, there will be no trade in the
laissez-faire equilibrium. This type of inefficiency is not specific to the self-
certification equilibrium. As private firms do not internalize the full consumer
24Herbal treatments are the most popular form of traditional medicine, and are highly
lucrative in the international marketplace. Annual revenues in Western Europe reached
US$ 5 billion in 2003-2004. In China sales of products totaled US$ 14 billion in 2005.
Herbal medicine revenue in Brazil was US$ 160 million in 200 (World Health Organization
”Traditional medicine” Fact sheet N134 December 2008).
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surplus yielded by the high quality product, this occurs for any certification
equilibrium that is market-driven. Secondly, if condition (10) holds and
several firms self-certify their products, this leads to duplicating the sunk
cost K, which is a pure waste. Each firm needs to make a profit larger than
K to certify. The duplication of the sunk cost implies that there will be
less entries in equilibrium. Higher concentration of firms in the downstream
market means higher prices, less exchange and a lower social surplus.
The welfare losses involved in the self-certification equilibrium are po-
tentially high. A centralized intervention, by government regulation or by
international NGOs in case of weak governance, can be a valuable remedy
to this type of market failure. This leads us to the study of an optimal
certification policy.
4.2 Optimal certification policy
There are increasing returns to scale in certification. Self-certification leads
to wasteful duplication of certification costs among downstream firms. To
strengthen the credibility of the certification process, the government should
thus encourage the creation of an independent certification firm or firms,
depending on market size, and regulate it to avoid consumer deception or
abuse of monopoly power. If this is not sufficient (i.e., if no private entity is
willing to enter the certification business), the government might choose to
monopolize the market for certification by setting up a public certification
agency.
Setting up an independent certification body costs K. We study the
optimal certification policy under two financial arrangements. In the first
one, labeled public, the government directly shoulders the certification cost.
To finance the cost of the certification process, it relies on public funds or on
foreign aid. In the second one, a private certification system financed with
a fee paid by the downstream firms, is favored. Indeed, some nations are
reluctant or unable to rely on their public funds to finance the certification
of private commodities. First of all, this raises the issue of cross-subsidization
when many taxpayers do not directly benefit from the certification process.
Secondly and more importantly for the purpose of the present analysis, this
solution would either increase the tax burden, which is already quite heavy
in some countries, or decrease public spending, which is already too low
in many developing countries. The paper derives the optimal certification
policy in both cases, and compares the welfare outcomes as a function of the
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opportunity cost of public funds.
4.2.1 We first consider the case of public funded certification. Govern-
ments typically pursue multiple objectives, such as the production of public
goods, the regulation of non competitive industries or the control of exter-
nalities, but under a single budget constraint. Since the latter usually binds,
the opportunity cost of public funds, defined as the Lagrange multiplier of
the government budget constraint, is strictly positive. Concretely, increasing
investment in certification means decreasing the production of essential pub-
lic goods such as national security and law enforcement, and of commodities
that generate positive externalities such as health care and education; or al-
ternatively, it means increasing the level of taxes or debt. All these actions
have a social cost, which must be traded off with the social benefit of certi-
fication. The term λ ≥ 0 denotes the opportunity cost of public funding. It
has been found to be generally higher in poorer countries.25
The following analysis assumes that the government is utilitarian. It
maximizes the sum of consumers’ surplus, S(p, v) = bv
2
(a − p)2, plus the
firms’ profits, Π(p, v) =
(
p − c(v))bv(a − p), minus the cost of funding the
certification fixed cost, −(1 + λ)K. Since the firms’ cost function is linear,
the utilitarian objective function is maximized by setting price equal to the
marginal cost p = c(v). In the case of a direct public funding of K, the
regulator solves:
Max
v
W (v) =
bv
2
(
a− c(v)
)2
− (1 + λ)K. (12)
The solution to problem (12) is the first-best level quality va defined in equa-
tion (5). The quantity produced is that of the first best level qa,b defined in
proposition 1. We deduce the value of the net social surplus of public funded
certification Sλ.
Sλ = S∗ − (1 + λ)K (13)
When λ is close to 0, this solution is close to the first best. When λ is
large, the net surplus decreases and might even become negative. For the
certification of private goods, countries whose λ is quite high will prefer to
rely on the final users to finance the certification costs.
25The opportunity cost of public funds is higher when, everything else being equal,
government revenue is lower. Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is typically much lower
in developing countries than in rich countries (see Auriol and Warlters 2005 and 2012).
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4.2.2 We next consider the case of a privately funded regime. We assume
that the certification agency chooses its tariff such as to break even. This
assumption is consistent with the market for certification being in the hand
of a nonprofit structure, such as an NGO (e.g., FLO-CERT), or regulated by
public authority or being contestable.26 Since we study product certification,
we assume that the certification process is financed by a fee, denoted τ(v),
on the quantities certified. The fee is linear in quantity, but it depends non
linearly on the level of quality to be ascertained. Alternatively, we could
consider a fixed fee paid by firms to get their production certified, as it is
generally the case with process certification, or any combinaison of the two
(i.e., non-linear tariff). Appendix 6.4 shows that the different methods for
financing the certification process are equivalent: they all yield the same
social surplus, which is the social surplus that a benevolent social planner
would implement under the constraint that the tariffs collected cover the
sunk cost of certification. Our results are independent of how the certification
service is charged to downstream firms. To illustrate them we hence present
the simple linear price case.
The linear fee charged to cover the certification cost satisfies the following
equation.
τ(v)bv
(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)
= K (14)
We deduce from equation (14) that
τ ′(v) =
−τ
[(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)
− c′(v)v
]
v
(
a− [c(v) + 2τ(v)]
) (15)
Certification is now an input in the production process for downstream
firms. The generalized marginal cost of the commodity for producers is
c(v) + τ(v) if they choose to certify, and c(v) otherwise. Therefore the cost
function,
(
c(v) + τ(v)
)
q, is linear in quantity. It remains compatible with
perfect competition. Under competitive pressure, firms set their price at
p = c(v) + τ(v) and they choose quality to maximize the net consumer
surplus S(p, v). They solve:
Max
v
bv
2
(
a− [c(v) + τ(v)]
)2
. (16)
26In practice, there can be several certification firms if the demand is large and if they
are subject to congestion effects.
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Using equation (15), one can check that the solution to the level of quality
in (16) is the first best level va defined in equation (5). Then at equilibrium
the optimal fee charged to cover the cost of certification satisfies τbva
(
a −
[c(va) + τ ]
)
= K. This second degree equation admits 2 roots. Solving it
for the smallest positive τa ≥ 0, so that demand is positive, we find that a
necessary condition for the project to be profitable is [a− c(va)]2 − 4Kbva ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to S∗ ≥ 2K which is also a necessary condition for self-
certification being profitable (see equation (11)). Then the equilibrium fee
level is
τa,b =
(
a− c(va)
)
−
(
[a− c(va)]2 − 4Kbva
)1/2
2
. (17)
The equilibrium quantity is qτa,b = bva
(
a − [c(va) + τa,b]
)
= bva
2
(
a − c(va) +√
(a− c(va))2 − 4Kbva
)
> 0, which is less than the first best level qa,b = bva
(
a−
c(va)
)
. We deduce the net social surplus when relying on a privately funded
regime:27
Sτ =
S∗
4
(
1 +
√
1− 2K
S∗
)2
(18)
It is easy to check that Sτ < S∗ − K. Due to the substitution effect,
there is a deadweight loss of the fee τa,b. Nevertheless, comparing this regime
with self-certification, that is comparing Sτ defined in equation (18) with SN
defined in equation(8) at N = N(K), we find SN ≤ Sτ as soon as 2K ≤ S∗.28
In other words, self-certification is never optimal compared to certification
by an independent private body. This result is very natural. The existence
of an independent body to carry out the certification process is preferable to
individual firms each trying to perform self-certification. Self-certification is
inefficient because individual firms need to invest heavily in order to make the
outcome of certification credible. By contrast, an independent certification
agency has a strong economic interest in maintaining a reputation of integrity.
As soon as consumers loose confidence in its labels it goes bankrupt.29 It is
27With a surplus S(p, v) = b2 (va− p)2 the fee is τa,b =
ava−c(va)−
√
(ava−c(va))2− 4Kab
2 so
that equation (18) is unchanged. This implies that proposition 2 is robust.
28That is, comparing SN =
(
( 2S
∗
K )
0.5−1
( 2S
∗
K )
0.5
)2
S∗ with Sτ = S
∗
4
(
1 +
(
1− 2KS∗
)0.5)2.
29This is what happened to Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the ”Big Five” accounting
firms, which was providing auditing, tax, and consulting services to large corporations.
In 2002, the firm surrendered its licenses to practice as Certified Public Accountants
29
the cheapest way to generate consumer confidence. With a single, indepen-
dent, certification firm or agency the fixed costs are not duplicated. The two
regimes are equivalent only when N = 1 and the downstream market is a
monopoly. Accordingly, in free-market economies voluntary certification is
generally carried out by independent firms or organizations.
4.2.3 Finally, we compare independent certification, either publicly or pri-
vately funded, with no certification at all, to derive the optimal certification
policy.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption that 2S ≤ K, the optimal certification
policy is not to certify if S
∗
K
≤ min
{
S
K
+ 1 + λ, 2
}
, and to certify otherwise.
In the latter case, the publicly funded regime is preferable to the privately
funded regime if and only if
λ ≤ λˆ =
S∗
K
− 1−
√
S∗
K
− 2
2
. (19)
Proof: Appendix 6.5
Figure 2 illustrates proposition 4. It represents the optimal certification
policy in the (S
∗
K
;λ) space. If S
∗
K
, the ratio of the net social surplus over the
fixed cost of certification, is small, it is preferable not to certify at all. For
larger values of trade surplus, the optimal choice between privately funded
certification and publicly funded certification, depends on the value of the
shadow cost of public funds. For a low value of λ, public funding is less
distorting than a fee levied on the certified product. However, when λ in-
creases it becomes more and more costly to rely on public funds. The regime
based on a user fee becomes preferable. This result is consistent with Ghatak
(2005), who predicts that NGO provision of public goods will be more preva-
lent in cases where the marginal cost of public funds is high. Regarding
the decision to purchase certified or uncertified commodities, public policy
is pivotal for demand characteristics so that S + (1 + λ)K < S∗ < 2K when
λ ≤ 0.5 (see the triangle below the horizontal dash line S∗
K
= 2 in the lower
in the United States after being found guilty of criminal charges relating to the firm’s
handling of the auditing of Enron, an energy corporation based in Texas, which had filed
for bankruptcy in 2001. This single fraudulent act of certification has destroyed Arthur
Andersen credibility and ultimately the company.
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S∗
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2
1 + S
K
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1 + S
K
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Sτ
S
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λ0, 5
no certification (p = c(v), v = v)
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0
Figure 2: Optimal Certification Policy
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part of the public funded area in Figure 2). In this case, an increase in the
opportunity cost of public funds might result in the termination of a pub-
licly funded program of certification and a sharp fall in the consumption of
certified commodities.
In advanced economies, λ is usually assumed to be equal to the dead-
weight loss due to imperfect income taxation. It is estimated at around 0.3
(Snower and Warren 1996). In developing countries low income levels and
difficulties in implementing effective taxation are large constraints on govern-
ment budgets. As a result, the opportunity cost of public funds in developing
countries is likely to be higher than 0.3. The World Bank (1998) suggests
an opportunity cost of 0.9 as a benchmark. We deduce that most developing
countries lie on the right side of the threshold value of λ = 0.5. If the country
is small (i.e., the size of the population of consumers is small), in addition to
being poor (i.e., low GDP per capita), then S∗ is small and the equilibrium
is the low quality uncertified one.
From an empirical point of view, Proposition 2 implies that laissez-faire
should occur for low values of surplus, represented by the vertically dashed
area in Figure 2. For larger values of surplus, we should observe either private
certification represented by the white area in Figure 2, or public certification
represented by the horizontally dashed area, which decreases with S∗. That
is, we should observe public certification when the opportunity cost of public
funds λ is low and when the surplus generated by certification is large enough.
The results presented in table 1 on actual certification policies for agricultural
seeds are consistent with the model’s predictions.
Secondly, focusing on consumption, Proposition 2 implies that the opti-
mal choice between certified and uncertified commodities is essentially driven
by demand characteristics and very little by certification policy. Indeed,
if S∗ ≥ 2K, then irrespective of the certification policy (i.e., public or
private), consumers purchase certified commodities. By contrast, if S∗ ≤
min
{
S + (1 + λ)K, 2K
}
, they purchase uncertified commodities. Since
S∗ = bva(a−c(va))
2
2
, we deduce that the consumption of certified commodi-
ties increases with a, a measure of consumer wealth, and with b, a measure
of the size of total demand.
The results in tables 2 and 4 on rice and wheat are consistent with this
prediction. The strong relationship between levels of demand (i.e average
per capita income and area grown with the seed) and levels of use of certified
seeds, is empirically verified. By contrast, the impact of public seed policies,
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such as price subsidies, on the adoption of certified seeds by farmers seems
rather weak. The regression analysis shows no impact on quantity consump-
tion. Yet the theory predicts that in case of public funding of the certification
cost, the level of consumption should be the first best level. Empirical results
are clearly inconsistent with this theoretical prediction.
In addition to the endogeneity problems mentioned in section 2.1, the neg-
ative, insignificant coefficient might reflect the ineffectiveness of public poli-
cies, as suggested by anecdotal evidence and field observations. Farmers from
poor countries are extremely reluctant to abandon their traditional seeds in
favor of unknown certified ones. They are risk averse because they lack in-
surance mechanism. If the new seeds do not grow properly, they will starve.
In addition, certified seeds that perform very well given the right settings are
very sensitive to seeding conditions and climatic variations. Certified seeds
might then simply be inappropriate for many developing countries, especially
those where rainfall is scarce and unpredictable (e.g. in sub-Saharan Africa).
This suggests that before investing scarce public funds in the form of subsi-
dies for certified seeds, governments of developing countries and aid agencies
should first carefully study the demand for this input. Indeed, with such
credence commodities, supply does not create demand.
Finally the reluctance of consumers to adopt the publicly provided certi-
fied product might reflect on our initial assumption of perfect certification,
where credibility is taken to be 100%. In many developing countries, where
corruption is high, this is a strong assumption and does not appear to be war-
ranted. Indeed, counterfeiting is greatest in countries where the regulatory
and legal oversight is weakest (WHO 2008).30 This is a case where NGOs can
play a very important role in delivering high quality products to the poor,
provided they have a reputation of integrity. For instance, international orga-
nizations such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Project Hope, Oxfam, provide health care
services and certified medicines in developing countries. In some cases (e.g.,
Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Tanzania) such donor aid pays
for more than 50% of the total country’s health bill.31 Similarly, the Fair
Trade, social labeling, sustainable and green production initiatives are car-
ried out by international nonprofit organisations. International aid agencies
30For instance in 2009 in Tanzania counterfeit medicines were found in 40 pharmacies.
This type of fraude undermines consumers confidence in certified products.
31See http://www.imva.org/Pages/orgfrm.htm.
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and NGOs can play a very important role in providing the funds and the
logistic for credible certification. In countries where there are organizations
eager to fund certification programs, the poor can benefit from them, either
as producers (e.g., fair trade, social labels) or as consumers (e.g., medicines,
seeds). By contrast, if there is no specific aid program, and no involvement
of NGOs dedicated to the certification activity, producers will be stuck in
the low quality, low premium segment of their market, and consumers will
generally be forced to buy uncertified products.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the problem of quality certification when quality is
a credence attribute. It has shown that the costlier the certification process,
the fewer will be the firms able to afford certification. In this sense the cost
of certification is a major factor in deciding market structure. High costs
lead to certification monopoly, and, in the extreme case, to no certification
at all: the market for high quality simply collapses. We have shown that cer-
tification through an independent certification body always dominates self-
certification. In the absence of external intervention, whether it should be
funded by a fee on final users or by public funds depends on the shadow
cost of public funding. However, this decision has little impact on the use of
certified products. The different cases defined by the interplay of the model’s
parameters (size of demand and opportunity cost of public funds) show that
the certification equilibrium is essentially driven by demand characteristics,
i.e. the wealth level of the population and the number of consumers. Our
theoretical analysis suggests rich countries should see a widespread use of
high quality certified products, whereas poor countries should see scant use
of them, even when those products are not too costly to produce. These
ideas were confronted with data on agricultural seed certification. Seed poli-
cies and seed consumption of the observed countries are indeed consistent
with model predictions.
Our analysis highlights the limitations of free markets, including mar-
kets for certification, when certain conditions are not met: these relate to
social parameters such as political governance and public trust, the func-
tionality of institutions, and general wealth levels and inequality. This is a
case where NGOs and international aid agency can play an important role
to help the poor access certification services, especially when government au-
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thorities themselves do not have sufficient credibility with the public to be
able to offer any effective certification. This is true for producers with Fair
Trade or social labeling initiatives; and it is also true for consumers with the
provision of medicinal drugs or agricultural inputs such as seeds. In today’s
interconnected world, certification in poor or less developed countries is less
an internal challenge than an international one.
The analysis does not examine the strategic role that NGOs and inter-
national aid agencies can play through certification. The main theoretical
limitation in this paper is to assume that if certification is profitable, it will
happen, somewhat mechanistically. But NGOs have their own agenda, for
example, fighting against child labor, and certification can be a means to
an end rather than an end in itself. It therefore remains to be seen how
the results obtained so far hold when NGOs are strategic. We leave this for
future research. The role of NGOs in this context is also in need of further
empirical research, especially when governments are corrupt or incompetent
and where, therefore, people cannot have access to high quality products.
Finally, the empirical analysis of seed certification was limited in this
paper by the amount and quality of available data. Clearly, given the impor-
tance of this subject, both for productivity and for consumption reasons, a
greater effort into the generation of good quality data is warranted. A similar
effort is also needed in the pharmaceutical industry, where unchecked drugs
are rife in developing countries and are of great concern for public health.
A better factual knowledge, as well as a better theoretical understanding,
of the extent and role of certification in both these areas would contribute
much to lifting two heavy burdens that weigh on the development of poor
countries.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Certified Seeds
We propose to illustrate the importance of certification issues for developing
countries using the certification of agricultural seeds. The value of certified
seed is twofold. Firstly, it guarantees a minimum quality, and secondly, it
guarantees a maximum sensitivity to specific agronomic conditions (climate,
disease, pest tolerance). The seed embodies the outcome of scientific invest-
ments. It leads to substituting new genetic material and knowledge to land,
labor and capital. To some, seed may appear to be a good characterized by
experience attributes rather than credence attributes. However, increased
yields and productivity remain conditional on how the cropping system is
managed. If seed performs poorly, it will be difficult to decide whether this
is due to poor farmer decision-making or to poor seed potential. However,
after several years of trials by several farmers in a given region, the seed
may become something of a hybrid containing both credence and experience
attributes. Until then, it must be considered as a credence good.
Data was found and compiled from an FAO publication ”FAO Seed Re-
view 1989-90”. The data set, recorded manually from the book, consist of
files on seed certification for a number of countries around the world. Not
all files contained useful quantitative information. Many, if not most OECD
countries were not represented, or had inadequate data, with the most con-
spicuous absence being the USA. No data set more recent than 1990 was
found. Its general quality and reliability must thus be seen as poor. Conclu-
sions to this study will need to be qualified by this proviso.
We focus on two staple foods: wheat and rice.32 There are 45 countries
with exploitable data for rice, and 43 countries with data on the volume of
certified seeds for wheat (see table 3). The volume of certified seed used at
the country level is expressed in both cases in metric tons.
We also use information available from the FAO Production Yearbook se-
ries (FAO 2004) and the World Development Indicators from the World bank
(WDI 2008) database to complete our analysis. Auxiliary data included 1989
GDP per head in constant 2000 US$ from WDI 2008, area grown in 1989-
32Rice is the grain with the second highest worldwide production, after maize. Maize
was left out because of technical reasons: it is a hybrid crop for which certification is
a necessity. Moreover a large portion of maize crops are grown for purposes other than
human consumption.
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1990 with rice, AREARICE, and with wheat, AREAWHEAT , in hectares
from the FAO 1994 seed review. It also includes, AGRIAV , agriculture value
added in percentage of 1989 GDP (source WDI 2008), a measure of the im-
portance of agriculture in a country economy. It also includes agricultural
production factors: FERTI, the total Fertilizers Consumption (metric ton)
average 1989-1990 (FAO 2004), TRACTOR, the number of tractors 1989
(WDI 2008), IRRIG, the arable land irrigated (sq Km) 1989 (WDI 2008),
and RURALPOP , the rural population in thousand 1989 (WDI 2008). Data
was recorded only for those countries for which certification data was avail-
able.
Finally, in the FAO seed review there is also information on the degree of
government involvement in seed market. A first level is when a country has
formal procedures to perform seed certification, in which case the dummy
Procedure is set at 1, and 0 otherwise. A second level is when a country
decides to intervene directly on prices by either subsidizing certified seeds
or by regulating their prices. Based on this information, we construct 3
dummies to capture the way the certified seed market is organized.
• Laissezfaire is equal to 1 when there is no public intervention in seed
markets, that is when Procedure = Pricecontrol = 0, and 0 otherwise.
• Private is equal to 1 if there are official procedures to certify seeds
together with free markets and prices. That is if Procedure = 1 −
Pricecontrol = 1 and 0 otherwise.
• Public is equal to 1 if all the prices in the seed market are subsidized
or regulated, and 0 if they are free (either totally free or mixed).
So in the end we have information on whether a country has (i) no seed
policy at all (Laissezfaire), (ii) a private sector providing seeds controlled
by a legal framework and procedure (Private), and (iii) (para)public seed
provision and/or public control of seed prices (Public).
An important variable for the analysis of public intervention in seed mar-
kets is a measure of the tightness of government’s budget constraint. Indeed,
depending on its resources, a government might want to subsidize the use of
certified seeds, or if it is too poor it might leave it entirely up to the mar-
ket. We use general government consumption expenditures in percentage
of 1989 GDP (source WBI 2008), denoted GOV CONSUMP , to proxy for
the government’s spending ability. It represents more accurately the govern-
ment’s budget constraint than government tax revenue. Tax revenues are
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not a good proxy for government budget constraints as they do not include
revenues from public firms, nor royalties (e.g., from natural resources), nor
debt. The results of the regression analyses are presented in table 1.
We next turn to the determinants of the demand for certified seed. To
get a preliminary view, we have run simple linear regressions (not shown to
save space) to evaluate the influence of GDP/capita and of area grown with
rice and wheat on the use of certified rice and wheat seeds respectively. As
expected, GDP per capita and cultivated area are good predictors for the
use of certified seeds. However a much better adjustment is obtained with a
log specification. In table 2, column 1 we present the results for rice.
We have also used various controls for the basic regression in column 1
of table 2. We have checked for population density, share of people with
no education, share and total number of people below age 14 in the total
population, migration rate, share of people working in agriculture, percent-
age of the country covered by forests, and livestock production index. None
of these variables had a coefficient significantly different from zero and are
omitted to save space. The only additional controls that turn out to be sig-
nificant are AFRICA and ASIA, two dummies equal to 1 if a country is in
the African (respectively Asian) continent and 0 otherwise. The regression
is: log(CERTIFRICE) = −3.04
(−1.19)
+ 0.4
(1.86)
log(GDP ) + 0.7
(5.63)
log(AREARICE) +
−2.05
(−2.74)
AFRICA− 1.18
(−2)
ASIA. In the above regression, t-statistics are between
brackets. The adjusted R2 is .63. When these two dummies are introduced
the GDP coefficient loses some significance, which is hardly surprising as
GDP is strongly negatively correlated with the African dummy. Everything
else being equal, African and to a lesser extent Asian countries used less certi-
fied seeds in rice production than their other characteristics would otherwise
lead us to predict. This might be because certified rice seeds have not been
developed for the harsh climatic conditions found on the African continent.
Indeed certified seed provides the potential for yield improvements, not the
improvements themselves. These need an appropriate technological package,
which includes the timing and conditions of seeding, follow-up cultivation,
the type and timing of fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide applications, up to
the timing and conditions of harvest.33 These complementary inputs are be-
33This is why certified seed suppliers usually provide such an information package along
with the seed material itself. Farmers pay for the whole package, not just the genetic
material.
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Table 3: The data
Country wheat certif rice certif area rice area wheat public laissezf private gov conso agriav
seed (mt) seed (mt) (Ha) (Ha) % GDP % GDP
Afghanistan 18100 NA NA 1675000 1 0 0 NA NA
Angola 0 NA 4000 3000 1 0 0 29 19
Bangladesh 22616 12009 10478188 560096 1 0 0 4 30
Benin 0 9 6651 0 1 0 0 11 38
Bhutan 83 216 26000 6420 1 0 0 19 37
Bolivia 7693 604 105090 278988 0 1 0 12 17
Brazil 85972 198645 5254159 12918980 0 0 1 15 9
Burkina Faso NA 13 20000 NA 1 0 0 20 28
Burundi NA NA 12000 11000 1 0 0 10 54
Cameroon NA NA 11280 300 1 0 0 11 26
Canada NA NA NA 13717500 0 0 1 21 3
Chile 2528 3911 32590 124650 0 0 1 10 9
Colombia 2744 65986 515800 800000 0 0 1 9 17
CongoDemR NA NA 459630 7200 0 1 0 10 29
CongoRep NA 110 1000 NA 1 0 0 19 13
Costa Rica NA 2255 50824 NA 0 0 1 14 12
Cote Ivoire NA 5000 545000 NA 1 0 0 18 33
Cuba NA 23000 167421 NA 1 0 0 27 NA
Cyprus 717 NA NA 5350 0 0 1 16 7
Denmark 93914 NA NA 444503 0 0 1 25 4
Dominic, Rep NA 17088 104568 NA 0 0 1 6 14
Ecuador 1382 2675 277590 465399 0 0 1 12 14
El Salvador 55 119 15515 276290 0 1 0 12 NA
Ethiopia 12 NA NA 647,63 1 0 0 13 53
Finland 9929 NA NA 151400 0 0 1 20 6
France 498432 1580 18965 5013000 0 0 1 22 4
Gambia NA 0 14049 NA 1 0 0 14 31
Germany 125739 NA NA 2553725 0 1 20 2
Greece 41825 2597 16100 915700 0 0 1 13 9
Guatemala 1041 1507 15120 22120 0 0 1 8 26
GuineaBissa NA 0 54639 NA 1 0 0 11 50
Haiti NA 400 61500 NA 0 1 0 9 NA
Hungary 171943 NA 11991 1242233 0 0 1 10 16
India 337300 178500 42176000 24090000 1 0 0 12 29
Iran 159000 NA 518994 6256892 1 0 0 13 23
Ireland 15400 NA NA 68000 0 0 1 16 10
Italy 110298 NA 210095 2703000 0 0 1 19 4
Jamaica NA NA 1235 NA 1 0 0 13 NA
Laos NA 15000 656654 NA 1 0 0 NA 61
Lebanon 670 NA NA 26250 1 0 0 18 NA
Madagascar NA 1600 1146000 2500 1 0 0 9 33
Malawi NA 700 25573 2119 0 0 1 16 48
Malaysia NA 3025 664137 NA 0 0 1 14 18
Malta NA NA NA 1300 0 1 0 18 4
Mauritius NA 0 5 NA 0 1 0 13 14
Mexico 38226 17991 151458 1073700 0 0 1 8 8
Morocco 73792 19 700 2629500 1 0 0 16 18
Mozambique NA NA 110000 4000 NA NA NA 13 47
Nicaragua NA 1127 45920 NA 0 0 1 27 NA
Niger NA NA 22536 4500 1 0 0 16 34
Nigeria NA 1240 1652000 50000 1 0 0 10 31
Oman 5 NA NA 500 1 0 0 27 3
Pakistan 44891 3248 2106900 7729600 0 0 1 17 27
Panama 634 8311 87910 71680 0 0 1 19 10
Paraguay 14033 NA 32400 237000 0 0 1 7 30
Peru 400 482 213313 117562 1 0 0 10 8
Philippines NA 20111 3497280 NA 1 0 0 10 23
Portugal 7388 1970 33630 323000 0 0 1 15 10
Qatar 3 NA NA 45 0 1 0 34 NA
Rep Korea 0 9046 1256661 364 1 0 0 12 10
rep ofGuinea NA 96 382551 NA 1 0 0 12 24
Rwanda 237 NA 3088 9000 1 0 0 13 40
SaudiArabia 170000 NA NA 780403 0 0 1 34 6
Spain 69299 5000 58500 2317300 0 0 1 16 6
Sri Lanka NA 2500 760000 NA 0 0 1 10 26
Swaziland NA NA 400 400 0 0 1 17 15
SyrianArabR 112000 NA 20 1239000 0 0 1 16 25
Tanzania 219 28 385310 57850 0 0 1 18 NA
Thailand 39 600 9879040 NA 1 0 0 10 15
Togo NA 112 19900 488 1 0 0 14 32
TrinidadTob 40 25 4800 1050 0 1 0 13 3
Tunisia 5595 NA NA 557000 0 0 1 17 13
Turkey 268000 2100 66000 9227000 0 0 1 9 17
Uganda NA NA 32000 4891 1 0 0 7 57
Uruguay 14831 17800 86633 227890 0 0 1 12 11
Venezuela NA 14610 114755 893 0 0 1 10 6
Yugoslavia 228748 NA 6056 1479000 1 0 0 NA NA
Zambia 1002 30 12811 9871 1 0 0 14 21
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yond the reach of poor African farmers. In fact, a simple correlation test
shows that the different inputs are highly correlated with GDP .
We have thus run a regression (not shown here to save space) with only
the inputs as explanatory variables (i.e., without AREARICE nor GDP ).
As one would expect, the sign of the coefficient of the number of tractors, the
volume of fertilizer, and the surface of irrigated land are all positive. However,
the only variable to be significantly different from 0 is irrigation. This makes
sense since rice is a crop that requires a lot of water to grow and certified
seeds are usually more sensitive to growing conditions than traditional seeds.
The size of the rural population, a proxy for labor in agriculture, has a
negative sign and is not significant. When inputs are added in with GDP
and AREARICE, none of them are significantly different from 0.
In Table 4 we reproduce for wheat the regressions of Table 2. There are 43
countries with exploitable data. Column 1 shows the basic regression. GDP
and AREAWHEAT coefficients are both positive and highly significant (at
the 1% level). With an adjusted R2 equals to 0.84, their explanatory power
is also very strong (stronger than for rice). As a matter of fact they are
the main, and almost sole predictors of the consumption of certified wheat
seeds. We next check how the use of wheat certified seeds is influenced by the
availability of other agricultural inputs. We run a regression (not shown here
to save space) with only the inputs as explanatory variables (i.e., without
GDP and AREAWHEAT ). The only variables to be significantly different
from 0 are irrigation and the number of tractors, which is intuitive in the case
of wheat. Column 2 shows the basic model with inputs as auxiliary variables.
AREAWHEAT is the only variable which is significantly different from 0.
The GDP coefficient is still positive but looses its significance due to the
strong correlation of a country’s wealth with the volume of modern inputs
used in agriculture.
We also check the robustness of the basic regression to the addition
of other controls: population density, the share of people with no educa-
tion, the share and the total number of people below age 14 in the to-
tal population, the migration rate, the share of people working in agricul-
ture, the percentage of the country covered by forests, the livestock pro-
duction index, and the Asia and Africa dummies. The only two variables
that have a coefficient significantly different from zero are the percentage of
the country covered by forests and the livestock production index. The re-
gression is: log(CERTIFWHEAT ) = −14.44
(−6.45)
+ 0.85
(14.74)
log(AREAWHEAT ) +
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Table 4: Demand for Wheat Certified Seed
Dependent Variable: log(CERTIFWHEAT)
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -6.95 -7.18 -6.33 -6.82 -8.18
(-5.75)*** (-2.39)** (-5.11)*** (-4.79)*** (-5.25)***
log(GDP) 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.53
(3.9 )*** (1.11) (9.99)*** (2.95)*** (3.54)***
log(AREAWHEAT) 1.0 0.83 0.95 0.99 1.02
(21.64)*** (2.75)*** (12.83)*** (16.47)*** (22.49)***
log(TRACTOR) 0.23
(0.64)
log(FERTI) -0.17
(-0.55)
log(IRRIG) 0.13
(0.4)
log(RURALPOP) 0.02
(0.2)
LAISSEZFAIRE -1.39
(-1.11)
PRIVATE 0.08
(0.15)
PRICECONTROL 0.6
(1.12)
No. Obs. 43 40 43 43 43
R2 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84
Sum squared Resid 66.18 59.3 60.12 66.13 63.92
Columns (1) to (5) were estimated by ordinary least squares. White heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are used to calculate t-statistics, which are reported in
parentheses. Significance is denoted by *** (1%); ** (5%); * (10%).
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0.33
(2.81)
log(GDP )+−0.61
(−4.77)
log(FORESTAREA)+ 2.74
(4.85)
log(LIV ESTOCK). In the
above regression, t-statistics are between brackets. The adjusted R2 is .82.
and the F -statistic is a significant 44.02. As expected the coefficient of the
livestock production index is positive while the coefficient of the percentage
of the country covered by forests is negative. In all these regressions, our
basic results hold.
Finally we add the policy dummies to assess their impact on the adoption
of wheat certified seeds. They all have the expected sign (i.e., negative for
laissezfaire, positive for private and pricecontrol). However, contrary to
the rice regression, none of the dummy coefficients are significatively different
from 0. This might be the result of the endogeneity problem mentioned ear-
lier. Yet we should observe some variation here as in practice the endogeneity
problem is stronger for PRICECONTROL than for LAISSEZFAIRE.
Indeed, price control is a choice by government to fight low agricultural pro-
ductivity. It is necessarily endogenous. It is less clear for laissez-faire which
might reflect nothing (i.e., it might be the optimal policy derived in the the-
ory, but more plausibly it might reflect a lack of interest or incompetence
and laziness on the part of public officials). The absence of effect might also
be explained by the fact that seed policies in poor countries are designed to
address low productivity in staple crops, which is rice, not wheat. In this
case, we expect seed policy to be less relevant for wheat than for rice.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider first the case of a single producer that has sunk K. The monopoly
maximizes with respect to v and p: ΠM = bv(a− p)(p− c(v)). It is straight-
forward to check that it chooses vM = va solution of equation (5) and that
pM =
1
2
(a+ c(va)). Now if several firms enter the market for a certified good,
the individual profit depends on the competitor’s quality/price strategy. We
solve it backwards. We consider the price of any firm j = 1, .., N given a
quality vector (v∗1, ..., v
∗
N). By virtue of lemma 1 consumers purchase from
the firm that maximizes vh(a − ph)2. It implies that if there exists a firm
h = 1, .., N such that pj > a−
( v∗j
v∗h
)0.5
(a− p∗h) then qj = 0 and Πj = −K. In
equilibrium, pj = a −
( v∗j
v∗h
)0.5
(a − p∗h) for any j, h ∈ {1, .., N}. Substituting
pj in the profit expression, and denoting αj the firm’s market share in the
total demand, we get Πj = αjvj(a − pj)b(pj − c(vj)) − K. Optimizing Πj
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with respect to vj yields vj = va with va solution to equation (5).
The result is similar if S(p, v) = b
2
(va− p)2. The monopoly still max-
imizes with respect to v and p: ΠM = b(av − p)(p − c(v)). It is straight-
forward to check that it chooses vM = va solution of c
′(v) = a and that
pM =
1
2
(a+vac(va)). Now if several firms enter the market for a certified good,
the individual profit depends on the competitor’s quality/price strategy. We
solve it backwards. We consider the price of any firm j = 1, .., N given a qual-
ity vector (v∗1, ..., v
∗
N). By virtue of lemma 1 consumers purchase from the firm
that maximizes (avh − ph)2. It implies that if there exists a firm h = 1, .., N
such that pj > ph + a
(
v∗j − v∗h
)
then qj = 0 and Πj = −K. In equilibrium,
pj = p
∗
h +a
(
vj− v∗h
)
for any j, h ∈ {1, .., N}. Substituting pj in the profit ex-
pression, and denoting αj the firm’s market share in the total demand, we get
Πj = αjb(avj−pj)(pj−c(vj))−K = αjb(av∗h−p∗h)(p∗h−av∗h+avj−c(vj))−K.
Optimizing Πj with respect to vj yields vj = va with va solution to equation
c′(v) = a. QED
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The certification equilibrium prevails if and only if there exists an N ≥ 1
integer such that (i) S∗ ≥ (N+1)2
2
K (i.e., producers are willing to produce)
and (ii) S∗ ≥ (1 + 1
N
)2S (i.e., consumers are willing to purchase) hold simul-
taneously. Inequality (i) is equivalent to N ≤
(
2S∗
K
)0.5
− 1, and (ii) to N ≥
1(
2S∗
K
)0.5
−1
. S∗ < S, (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously if and only if there exists
N ≥ 1 integer such that: 1(
2S∗
K
)0.5
−1
≤ N ≤
(
2S∗
K
)0.5
−1. A necessary and suf-
ficient condition for such an integer to exist is that:
(
2S∗
K
)0.5
−1− 1(
2S∗
K
)0.5
−1
≥
1.5 This is equivalent to: S∗ − (S∗)0.5[S0.5 + (2K)0.5] + (KS)0.5 ≥ 0. We
solve the second degree equation in (S∗)0.5 and find two roots (S∗−)
0.5 =
S0.5+(2K)0.5−(S+2K)0.5
2
and (S∗+)
0.5 = S
0.5+(2K)0.5+(S+2K)0.5
2
. Condition (i) and
(ii) hold simultaneously if and only if S∗ ≤ S∗− or S∗ ≥ S∗+. Since S∗− is lower
than S, we are left with (S∗+)
0.5. We easilydeduce condition (10). QED
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6.4 Non-linear tariff to finance the certification cost K
In the main text we consider the case where the certification agency imposes
a linear fee on the quantities to be certified. This is consistent with product
certification, which is the main focus of the paper (as opposed to process
certification). However, one can also consider a fixed fee paid by firms to get
their production certified, as it is generally the case with process certification,
and more generally any combination of the two. In what follows we show
that the different ways to finance the certification cost all generate the same
social surplus.
6.4.1 Privately funded certification by a fixed fee k
In this section, we show that the two ways of financing the certification pro-
cess are equivalent. In both cases, we focus on a budget-balanced equilibrium.
If the certification agency imposes a fixed fee, denoted k > 0, to certify the
firms’ products, this fee must be such that, in equilibrium, the cost K is
covered. With a fixed fee k > 0, the number of firms that will choose to
certify their products will be N(k) defined by equation (9). We deduce that
k > 0 must be such that N(k)k = K, where N(k) =
{(
2S∗
k
)0.5
− 1
}
. This
yields:
k
{(
2S∗
k
)0.5
− 1
}
= K, (20)
which is equivalent to
k2 − 2k(S∗ −K) +K2 = 0. (21)
Under the assumption that S∗ > 2K, this equation admits two positive roots.
The smallest one is the solution to the certification agency problem:
k∗ = S∗ −K − S∗
√
1− 2K
S∗
. (22)
By virtue of equation (8), the social surplus generated by this equilibrium is
Sk =
(
N(k∗)
N(k∗) + 1
)2
S∗. (23)
Substituting N(k∗) from equation (9), yields:
Sk =
(
1−
√
k∗
2S∗
)2
S∗, (24)
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which is equivalent to
Sk =
1−
√√√√1− KS∗ −√1− 2KS∗
2

2
S∗. (25)
Now we need to show that Sk = Sτ , where Sτ is defined by equation (18):1−
√√√√1− KS∗ −√1− 2KS∗
2

2
S∗ =
(
1 +
√
1− 2K
S∗
)2
S∗
4
. (26)
This is equivalent to showing that:
2−
√
2
√
1− K
S∗
−
√
1− 2K
S∗
= 1 +
√
1− 2K
S∗
, (27)
or
1 +
(
1− 2K
S∗
)
− 2
√
1− 2K
S∗
= 2
(
1− K
S∗
−
√
1− 2K
S∗
)
. (28)
We deduce the result. QED
6.4.2 Non-linear tariff Ta(q) = k + τaq
We show next that if the certification entity relies on more sophisticated
tarification schemes it does not change the results. Let Ta(q) = k + τaq be
the two-part tariff charged by the certification entity. Let Ca = c(va) + τa.
With a fixed part k in the tariff and a variable charge τa the number of firms
that will choose to certify their output is
N(k, τa) =
√
bva
k
(a− Ca)− 1. (29)
The certification body must break even so that:
N(k)k + τa
N(k)
N(k) + 1
vab(a− Ca) = K. (30)
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The first term in (30) represents the total fixed fees collected with N(k) firms
paying it and the second term is the variable fee collected when N(k)
N(k)+1
vab(a−
Ca) units of output are certified. Substituting N(k) from (29) into (30) yields
after some rewriting:√
k
bva
(a− Ca)− k
bva
+ τa
(
a− Ca −
√
k
bva
)
=
K
bva
. (31)
Let x =
√
k
bva
. Equation (31) is equivalent to a second degree equation:
−x2 + x(a−Ca − τa) + τa(a−Ca)− Kbva = 0. Let τa,b be defined in (17). For
τa ∈ [0, τa,b] equation (31) admits two positive roots. The smallest one is the
solution to the benevolent planner’s constraint. That is, for all τa ∈ [0, τa,b]:√
k
bva
=
a− Ca − τa −
√
(a− Ca − τa)2 + 4τa(a− Ca)− 4 Kbva
2
(32)
It is easy to check that if in (32) τa = 0 then k is equal to k
∗ defined in
equation (22). Symmetrically if in (32) τa = τa,b defined in (17), then k = 0.
We next compute the surplus of trade when the principal uses a two-
part tariff that satisfied (32) for τa ∈ [0, τa,b]. The surplus of trade from
tarification (k, τa) is:
S(k, τa) =
(
N(k)
N(k) + 1
)2
vab(a− Ca)2
2
. (33)
Substituting N(k) from (29) into (33), the surplus is:
S(k, τa) =
vab
2
(
a− Ca −
√
k
bva
)2
. (34)
Substituting
√
k
bva
from (32) in (34) yields after some simplifications:
vab
8
(
a− cva +
√
(a− cva)2 − 4
K
bva
)2
=
S∗
4
(
1 +
√
1− 2K
S∗
)2
(35)
In other words, whatever the tariff structure adopted by a budget balancing
certification entity, it always yields the same surplus. QED
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Certification through public funding is better than no certification if and
only if Sλ ≥ S. This is equivalent to S∗
K
≥ S
K
+ 1 + λ. Similarly market
funded certification, which requires S∗ ≥ 2K, is better than no certification
if and only if Sτ ≥ S. This is equivalent to
(
1− 2K
S∗
)0.5
≥ 2
(
S
K
)0.5
− 1 when
S∗ ≥ 2K. Under the assumption 2S ≤ K, S∗ ≥ 2K implies that S∗ ≥ 4S
and thus that 2
(
S
K
)0.5
− 1 ≤ 0. We deduce that market funded certification
using a linear tax is better than no certification if and only if S
∗
K
≥ 2. Finally
a publicly funded regime is preferable to a self-funded regulation regime if
and only if Sτ ≤ Sλ as defined in equations (18) and (13). This is equivalent
to: λ ≤ S∗
4K
(
1 − (1 − 2k
S∗
)0.5)2
. Developing the right hand side yields (19).
QED
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